Prices in Recession and Recovery: A Survey of Recent Changes by Frederick C. Mills
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research
Volume Title: Prices in Recession and Recovery: A Survey of Recent Changes 




Series: General Series No. 31
Publication Date: 1936
Chapter Title: General Aspects Of Recent Price Movements
Chapter Author: Frederick C. Mills
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5564
Chapter pages in book: (p. 3 - 38)CHAPTER I
GENERAL ASPECTS OF RECENT PRICE
MOVEMENTS
THE phases of business cycles to which we apply the terms
crisis and recession are marked, characteristically, by a gen-
eral reduction of prices, a shifting of relative values and a
downward readjustment of a great mass of creditor claims.
The severity of these deflationary processes varies, of course,
from cycle to cycle, being affected by all the forces at play in
the cyclical fluctuations of business. Their character and con-
sequences vary, also, with changes in economic organization.
With a heavier burden of fixed expenses, with a more exten-
sive debt structure, with a money economy that penetrates
more deeply into the everyday activities of men, a general
deflation and the readjustments it entails may be expected to
place greater strains upon the economic system. This is not
to say that the causal forces, if we could locate them, neces-
sarily differ from time to time. Different reactions to these
forces may be expected because the organization and operat-
ing characteristics of the system at large have been modified
with the passage of time.
For this reason a survey of certain aspects of the most
recent recession is of special interest. Here we may follow the
process of deflation in a modern industrial economy and the
movement towards readjustment on a new operating basis.
With the single exception of the 1920—21 recession, which
was so closely tied to the aftermath of war as to lose somewhat
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in broader economic significance, the latest recession pro-
vides our only example of a major crisis in the working of
the highly integrated, industrialized economies, with their
complex price and financial systems, that have reached ma-
turity in the last quarter century. In this study, it is true,
we shall be dealing only with certain aspects of recession and
recovery, but to view these movements in proper perspective
some account should be taken of the changes that the twen-
tieth century has brought in the economic systems of western
nations.
The present investigation centers in the behavior of prices,
in relation to the general operations of the economic system,
during a period preceding and including the recession and
recovery of 1929—36.Pricemovements played a dominant
role in the recession of general business that began in the
United States in the summer of 1929,andin the ensuing
phases of this business cycle. There have been longer price
declines in American economic history, but if we take ac-
count of the combined factors of scope, duration and inten-
sity, itis improbable that our price system has ever been
exposed to destructive forces more devastating than those of
1929—33.Forno less than forty-three months prices declined
and the price structure crumbled. The economic ills engen-
dered by the general decline were intensified by the extreme
inequalities of the changes occurring in different parts of
the price system. A score of major disparities developed, and
these continued to increase as the price decline persisted.
The pains of this severe recession have emphasized the
role of prices in a modern industrial economy. The exchange
mechanism that intervenes between the processes of produc-
tion and consumption, in an economy marked by great
division of labor, is ordinarily an unobtrusive element in our
economic environment. When it functions smoothly and well
we give little heed to it. But when matters do not go smoothlyGENERAL ASPECTS 5
we are acutely aware of our dependence upon an elaborate
system of exchange relationships, a system that has been
growing more complex and delicate with the passage of time.
This dependence of physical economic processes upon a
pricing system is well recognized, but it is perhaps not as
clearly realized that the character and degree of dependence
vary from time to time, and that the instruments of exchange
take on new attributes as they develop. Indeed, the severity
of the most recent depression may be attributed in consid-
erable part to the characteristics of the exchange mechanism
and to its failure to meet the requirements placed upon it
by an industrial system that has itself been profoundly modi-
fied during recent decades. Changing industrial processes on
the one hand, changing attributes of the pricing and ex-
change system on the other—these are two of the major
dynamic elements of economic life today. In combination,
they have played a leading part in accentuating the severity
of the second great post-War depression.
In this study no attempt is made to deal exhaustively with
all the many-sided monetary and price problems that this
depression has generated. Since we are interested in the
general efficiency of our present price system as an instru-
ment facilitating the physical processes of economic life, we
shall seek to define the broad characteristics of the price
recession and the subsequent recovery in relation to earlier
experience. But our major concern is with the changing posi-
tions of certain important producing groups, and with the
varying fortunes of consumers, under the impact of changes
in industrial productivity and shifts in the distribution of
purchasing power. The economic movements of the fifteen
years preceding the recession of 1929andthe wide fluctua-
tions of the last seven years have brought important altera-
tions in the status of different producing groups. A knowledge
of these shifts and of the forces that lie behind them is essen-6 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
tial to an understanding of the economic changes of recent
years.1
SOME FACTORS IN THE PRICE RECESSION OF 1929
The causes of a general price decline are seldom open to
precise definition. A general break in prices may be initiated
by minor and obscure factors, when the structure of prices is
weak. Certain factors contributing to the recent collapse of
world prices may be defined in general terms, but no attempt
is made to indicate their relative importance, or to set forth
the exact combination of circumstances that precipitated the
decline. In this account we deal in the main with world
conditions, for the price recession in the United States was
but a phase of a world-wide decline.
During the first post-War decade facilities for the produc-
tion of foodstuffs and major raw materials were over-devel-
oped, relatively to the opportunities for sale through existing
markets at the prices necessary to cover costs and yield
satisfactory profits. Resulting price weakness was in part
concealed, because of the influence of ample credit (which
facilitated the application of valorization schemes) and of
heavy foreign lending to raw material producing countries.
The maintenance of consumer demand in the United States
through the development of new credit instruments and the
presence of non-recurring elements of income (notably spec-
ulative profits) served also to support expenditures and
Itis impossible, of course, to define with precision changes in the relative
status of different economic groups when prices alone are compared. Con-
current changes in costs and in volume of output bear directly upon the
analysis of price movements. In the present study use is made of supple-
mentary cost and production records, where available, in interpreting price
changes. But our chief concern is with the inter-relations of prices. Though
the price record alone is inadequate, itis more comprehensive and more
accurate than any other general record of economic changes.GENERAL ASPECTS 7
prices prior to 1929.Heavyinternational lending, at rates
that declined up to1928,helpedto maintain buying
power and stimulated the shouldering of excessively heavy
financial obligations by raw material producing countries.
The check to lending to debtor countries, which was first felt
in 1928,andthe increased difficulty of securing credit, placed
such countries in serious straits. Domestic expenditures were
reduced, many valorization schemes had to be abandoned,
and the service of foreign debts became difficult. The forced
selling in foreign markets of the major products of these
debtor countries (raw materials, primarily) weakened the
markets, and prices of important staples fell.
The usual instruments for the correction of such a sit-
uation(a correction made in pre-War years through the
gold standard and international credit mechanisms working
under conditions of relatively free trade) were ineffective,
partly because of the lack of highly developed financial insti-
tutions in most debtor countries, partly because of the faulty
working of the post-War gold standard when creditor coun-
tries were unwilling to receive goods, partly because of the
very magnitude of the difficulties involved.
Reduced buying by debtor countries contributed to a drop
in production and employment in industrial countries. This
situation was aggravated by the reduction of domestic pur-
chasing in the United States as speculative profits turned to
losses with the ending of the boom in securities.
The resulting curtailment of expenditures for both capital
equipment and consumption goods led to further declines
in prices and production, further unemployment, and further
reductions of income disbursements. The necessity of reduc-
ing costs, which was faced by manufacturing establishments
as a result of declining sales and the pressure of declining
prices among important commodity groups, entailed serious
and cumulative deflation in industrial areas. The vicious8 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
spiral thus started was made worse by the. spread of uncer-
tainties and fears, which still further reduced expenditures
for new equipment and, to some extent, for consumption
goods. This curtailment of general business activity was re-
flected in a marked decline in the velocity of circulation of
money and credit.
The gold situation intensified the movements due to these
conditions. The general resumption of the gold standard in
the middle years of the post-War decade led to an increased
demand for the existing stocks of gold. The resulting de-
mands upon the gold supply were accentuated by a world
distribution of gold that was disproportionate to the world's
commercial and financial needs. There is no clear evidence
of pressure upon prices from the monetary side prior to
1929,butthere appears to have been no great margin of
gold supply above the world's needs, under the existing bank-
ing conditions. Causal relations between the movements of
prices and gold reserves during the recession are difficult to
establish. It is probable, however, that a deficiency of gold
and credit contraction in certain areas combined with other
economic conditions to push the world price level constantly
lower. But causal relations almost certainly ran in the other
direction also. It is not necessary to assume a one-way rela-
tionship between monetary conditions and prices. Unequal.
price declines, reflecting variations in the incidence of world
recession, contributed to the disparate movements of national
gold reserves which were so conspicuous a feature of this
period 2
2 Evidenceof a relationship in time between declining gold reserves and
price movements front 1929onis given by Layton and Crowther, An Intro-
duction to the Study of Prices (London, Macmillan, 1935), p.189, citing
Kitchen's data. In 1929thegold reserves of five strong 'creditor' countries
(United States, France, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium) began to rise
sharply, while the gold reserves of the rest of the world fell off rapidly. TheGENERAL ASPECTS g
The price recession thus initiated reached a bottom, in
the United States, in February 1933.Withinfive months of
that date the level of wholesale prices in the United States
had advanced 15 per cent; within twenty-four months, 33 per
cent. The upward turn was sharper and more pronounced
than in the usual cyclical advance. Rates of gain varied, but
the stimulus of recovery was felt on a broad front. For many
reasons this price advance is of peculiar interest, and the im-
mediate problems raised by it are of exceptional urgency.
PRICE RECESSION AND RECOVERY:
COMPARATIVE MEASUREMENTS
The distinctive characteristics of the price decline of
1929—33 may be best appreciated when it is contrasted with
similar movements of the past. The declines closest to it in
severity are those that occurred during the business recessions
of 1873 and The fall of prices in 192o—22 was the most
movements of world prices paralleled the general decline of gold reserves in
the majority of countries.
If this relationship is taken to be causal, the argument assumes that the
increasing gold reserves of the five creditor countries did not furnish off-
setting stimulation towards higher prices. It is true that domestic conditions
in these countries were not conducive to the use of new reserves in credit
expansion. In considerable degree, then, gold surpluses were inactive while
gold deficiencies were active factors, during this period. But these very
deficiencies, as we have noted, were probably related to disparate world price
movements. Unequal price movements, reflecting the play of a variety of
specific forces, helped to create disparities in gold reserves; where such
reserves were forced lower, credit was contracted and downward pressure
exerted on prices. Where such reserves were augmented, surpluses werein
good part sterilized; they did not exert an upward pressure on domestic and
international prices. Just such a mixture of circular relations in a disorgan-
ized world economy characterized the chaotic price situation of 1929—1933.
3 Records of changes in wholesale prices during the three recessions are
shown below. In interpreting these movements we must note that the index
numbers for recent years are more comprehensive, and that greater weight
is given to manufactured goods. Since these conditions would be expected to10 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
severe of the three declines(wholesale prices fell 45 per
cent), but the briefest. The storm had passed within twenty
months. Most prolonged was that which began in 1873. A
net decline of 39 per cent in the level of wholesale prices was
stretched over more than six years. Practically the same net
fall, 38 per cent, occurred from 1929 to 1933, but it extended
over forty-three months only. In rapidity of price decline,
per month, the last was between the two earlier
ones.
These changes are plotted in Figurei, which reveals
clearly certain marked differences between these periods,
with respect to the behavior of general prices. Prior to the
beginning of the price decline of 1873theprice level moved
upwards slowly.(There were, in fact, twenty preceding
months of irregular price advance, following seven years of
irregular decline.) Before the recession of 1920—2 i the price
level rose sharply. (This rise had continued, with minor in-
terruptions, more than five years.:) Before the current reces-
sion the price level sagged slightly.(A slight declining
tendency had prevailed since 1925.) More striking are the
differences prevailing forty-three months after the initiation
of the several recessions. This stage finds the decline of the
'70's still in progress. Prices had fallen 20 per cent, but an
equal fall, extending over two and one-half years, lay ahead.
make the later indexes more sluggish, the amplitude and intensity of the
recent decline are the more significant.
The index covering the first period is that of Warren and Pearson, Prices
(Wiley, 1933), pp. 10—14. The index of the Bureau of Labor Statistics was
used in tracing price movements during the other periods.
DATE OF LOW DURATION OF DEGREE OF RAPIDITY OF
DATE OF HIGHBEFORE ADVANCE DECLINE DECLINE DECLINE
(per cent
(months)(per cent)per month)
1873—79April 1873 June 1879 74 39 0.7
1920—22May1920 Jan.1922 20 45 3.0
1929—33July1929 Feb. 43 1.1GEN ERALASPECTS 11
FIGURE 1
WHOLESALE PRICES IN THE
PERIODS OF RECESSION
UNITED STATES DURING THREE
AND SUBSEQUENT CHANGE
The drop of1920—2 2had reached its bottom and asteady
price recovery was in progress. Already prices had advanced
7 per cent above their low point. Forty-three months after
the beginning of the decline of 1929—33 a bottom had appar-
ently been reached.The months that followed were to wit-
ness a sharp upturn, the nature of which will concern us
subsequent sections.
in
These three price drops—the slow, persistent decline of the
'70's, the violent but relatively brief collapse of 1920—22, and
the steady cumulative pressure of the drop that began in
1929—illustrate diverse types of price behavior during severe
economic recessions. The distinctivefeatures of the most
recent decline reflect, in part, the novel characteristics of the
preceding expansion. Some of these are discussed in the next
chapter.
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A quick view of the course of recovery during the first
nine, twelve and twenty-one months of advance after the
depression low in each of these phases of recovery will pro-
vide perspective in judging recent events. Price changes dur-
ing these periods are shown graphically in FigureThe
rise that began in 1879wasthe most rapid of the three over
the first nine months of recovery. A gain of 25 per cent was
registered, as against 19 per cent between February and
November 1933,andopercent in the first nine months of
1922. The advance of 1879—81 was sharply curtailed, how-
ever. During the first twelve months of recovery the most
recent period has the highest record, with that of 1879—81
next. If we extend the record to cover twenty-one months
(up to November 1934,forthe last period) the advance of
1933—34stillhas a striking lead. A decline, associated with
the next cyclical recession, had already terminated the price
recovery of 1922—23.
The rapidity of the latest advance is the more striking
because of the greater scope and sluggishness of the index
numbers for recent years. When we follow the movements
of fully comparable measurements, Warren and Pearson's
index numbers of the prices of thirty basic commodities,5 the
contrast is enhanced. In nine months of 1933—34theseprices
rose 44 per cent, as against advances of 27 and 37 per cent in
4Following are the corresponding measurements:
DEGREE OF DECREEOF DECREEOF
DATE OF LOW ADVANCE IN ADVANCE IN ADVANCE IN
BEFORE ADVANCE FIRST 9 FIRST 12 FIRST 21
MONTHS MONTHS MONTHS
(per cent) (per cent) (per cent)
1879—81 June1879 25 14 i8
1922—23 Jan.1922 9 12 9
1933—34 Feb. 19 28 23
5Constructed by George F. Warren and Frank A. Pearson, New York State













periods ofequal lengthin 1879—81and1922, respectively.
But it was not only the general fall in prices that subjected
the American economy to great stress,during the recent de-
dine. The marked inequalities of the changes invarious
parts of the price structure added a further burden. The
character and magnitude of these inequalities are indicated
June 1819 June 1880
Jan. 1922 Jan. 1923
Feb. 1933 Feb. 193414 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
by the accompanying measurements.6 (The index numbers
JulyFeb.Feb.Feb.Feb.June
RECESSION AND RECOVERY19291933'9341935£9361930
Wholesaleprices ioo 62 76 82 84 82
Cost of living of industrial workersioo 74 788i8i 82
Prices received by farmers ioo 37 56 76 74 73
Hourly earnings, employed manu-
facturing labor ioo 77 96103 104104
RECOVERY
Wholesaleprices ioo123133135132
Cost of living of industrial workers 100io6109 110 112
Pricesreceived by farmers 100 151 202 198194
Hourly earnings, employed manu-
facturing labor 100 134135
shown are not comparable in detail; they serve the present
purpose, however, in defining major changes among elements
of the price system during recession and recovery.) Dispari-
ties resulting from these and similar movements reflect pro-
nounced shifts in the relative incomes and buying power of
different groups. Under contemporary conditions, in an
economy marked by important frictions that prevent prompt
adaptation to changed relations, these shifts may lead to
severe and persistent disturbances. The movement of goods
along previously existing channels of exchange is impeded,
and the creation of new channels may be a slow process. A
significant diminution of the indicated schisms took place in
the recovery following February i
Recession and revival, as their cumulative effects are felt
throughout the price system, tend to follow certain fairly
6 The index number of wholesale prices is that of the U. S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics; the cost of living index is that of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
with interpolations based on the index of the National Industrial Conference
Board; the index of hourly earnings was secured by splicing an index of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1932—36 to an index of the National
Industrial Conference Board for 1929—32. The index, of prices received by
farmers is constructed by the U. S. Bureau of, Agricultural Economics.GENERAL ASPECTS '5
uniform patterns. The typical recession is marked by a few
initial declines in the prices of the most sensitive commodi-
ties, followed closely by a more general and more precipitous
drop. The entire movement is a relatively concentrated, uni-
fied downturn, as the price structure reacts to the impact of
recession. Price revival is a different process, slower in its
cumulative spread and more extended in time. The genera-
tion of recovery has not the swiftness of movement that marks
the destructive phase of the cycle. These two phases are rep-
resented by the upper diagrams in Figure 3 which show the
timing of price recession and revival in wholesale markets
during the business cycle that ran its course in the United
States between and 1923. These furnish standards with
which we may compare more recent price fluctuations.7
The movements during the recession of 1929—33 and the
subsequent revival, which are represented by two of the dis-
tributions shown graphically in Figure 3, constitute a striking
reversal of customary experience during price recessions and
revivals. In place of the usual concentrated, compact down-
turn of prices during recession, such as occurred in somewhat
exceptional degree in 1920, we have a far more proiracted
change centering about the July 1929 turning point. Reces-
sions of individual commodity prices extended over many
months, instead of being concentrated within a few months.8
The reasons for this marked difference in behavior are
found, in part, in the economic details of the two recessions
—in the price and quantity relations among the hundreds of
individual commodities entering into trade. Perhaps more
7 The corresponding measurements are given in Appendix I.
8 Comparable measurements of the degree of 'scatter' in the timing of price
declines in the recession of 1920—21 and in that of 1929—33are,respectively,
and 14.2.(These are the standard deviations of the two distributions
plotted. The standard deviation of the distribution of average figures repre-
senting ten phases of recession occurring between 1892 and 1924 iS 8.4.)i6 PRICES INRECESSION ANDRECOVERY
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backgrounds of the recessions,
pricing policies of business men. The 1920 recession followed















important,however,were the differencesin the immediate
and their effectsupontheGENERAL ASPECTS 17
thesharp War-time price rise, a rise that bore none of the
aspects of permanence. Values had not become entrenched
at the high levels of 1919andearly 1920, nor did heavy
capital investments at those levels serve to maintain existing
values. There was little basis, then, for resistance to liquida-
tion, once the forces of recession were felt. A concentrated,
fairly brief period of fall was the result.
The decline in commodity prices that began in 1929 OC-
curred at the end of a quite different period, marked by
fairly stable prices and by heavy investment at existing levels.
Here we had strongly entrenched values and a corresponding
reluctance to reduce prices. The more protracted and more
painful character of the decline that began in 1929 is partly
attributable to this condition.
The differences between the two periods of revival are not
so pronounced. Both depart somewhat from experience in
that price recovery was relatively compact and unified, with
the price movements of individual commodities closely con-
centrated in time. This was particularly marked in the most
recent recovery. Up to and including a date four months
after the low point in the general index (that is, up to June
1933) approximately 8o per cent of a list of 538 commodities
had advanced in price. Over similar periods in ten business
revivals between 1892 and 1922 about 6i per cent of the
groups of commodities studied rose in price, on the average.
In 1933,inplace of the slow cumulative recovery of the usual
cyclical revival, we had the concentrated reversal in the direc-
tion of price movements and the swift transmission of the
stimulus to change that usually characterize price recessions.
This particular recovery of prices was not the usual slowly-
germinating movement, but a speedy reaction to a' changed
economic outlook.
In other respects, too, recent price movements were marked
by distinctive features. Study of the sequence of change ini8 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
the prices of individual commodities during a number of
cyclical revivals reveals evidence of a general pattern to
which price movements during particular cycles conform in
gTeater or less degree.9 Moreover, the pattern of price revival
is not unrelated to the pattern of the preceding recession.
There is not complete uniformity, of course, but the tendency
towards a common sequence of price movements is clearly
apparent in the records of the last forty years.
When the sequence of price recovery in 1933iscompared
with the standard pattern of revival, a degree of conformity
less than that usually prevailing is found.'° So, also, the rela-
tionship between the sequence of recession in the prices of
individual commodities in 1929 (and the years following)
and the sequence of recovery in 1933 iS distinctly less marked
than that usually prevailing between recession and succeed-
ing revival." The movements of 1933 show few of those
regularities usually found in the cyclical behavior of com-
modity prices (regularities seldom of a very high order, it is
true). It was a price rise stimulated by novel forces and, in
0Cf.The Behavior of Prices (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1927),
p. 135.
10The coefficient of correlation between measurements defining the sequence
of price movements in the recovery of and similar measurements
defining the average sequence of recovery during eleven revivals between
1892 and 1924 is +.28. For earlier revivals the coefficient averages about
+.50. (The fact that the data of earlier revivals enter into the averages
that define the standard pattern would tend to make the second of these
coefficients higher than the first, but not by the amount of the difference
here existing.)
ii The coefficient of correlation between the timing of price changes during
the recession of 1929 and the recovery in 1933 is +.21, for records extending
to November 1932, for recession, and to June 1936 for revival (the number of
commodities included is 515). The addition of later observations for both
recession and revival would raise this coefficient to a value approximating
+.3o. The coefficient of correlation between the average timing of price
changes during revival and recession for ten complete cycles between 1892
and 1924 iS +.72.GENERAL ASPECTS 19
its detailed manifestations, differing significantly from the
run of cyclical revivals.
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF PRICE RECESSION
AND PRICE RECOVERY
To secure a just conception of the price movements in the
United States during the last seven years they must be seen
as phases of a world-wide change. The severity of the second
post-War depression and the difficulty of breaking it have
been due in considerable part to the universality of the
crisis. No nation, except Soviet Russia, escaped. Industrial
centers and colonial areas alike felt the impact of the general
decline. Here, again, we find differences in the degree, dura-
tion and intensity of the decline and in the degree of recov-
ery to date. The record of changes in wholesale prices in
thirty-two countries is summarized in Table 1.12 Price move-
ments in twelve countries (in terms of the various national
currencies) are portrayed graphically in Figure 4.
The record of drastic and universal price decline revealed
by this survey of the changes in different parts of the world
has no counterpart in recent economic history. Between
March 1928, marking the high point of prices in Latvia prior
to the recession proper, and September 1929, when New Zea-
land prices reached their peak before recession, thirty-two
countries felt the crumbling of their price foundations.'3
The median decline in wholesale prices among the countries
12 The index numbers from which the measurements in this and the follow-
ing table are derived are not comparable in the details of their composition.
Significance should not be attached, therefore, to small differences between
the figures given.
13 Itis not easy to set the precise date at which price recession began in
each country, because price levels were declining the world prior
to the beginning of this recession. But variations in the timing of the reces•
sion are probably fairly well indicated by the entries in Table i.20 PRICES IN RECESSIONAND RECOVERY
4
INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES IN TERMS OF NATIONAL
CURRENCIES, 1929-1936, TWELVE COUNTRIES
Ratio scaleGENERAL ASPECTS 21
here represented was 36 per cent, the median duration 54
months. The price drop of 1920—21, which started from a
highly inflated level, was somewhat more severe in ampli-
tude, but in duration was far short of the recent drop.
TABLE 1
PRICE RECESSION iN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES, 1928-1936
A SUMMARY OF CHANGES IN INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRIcES
(Price movements are here measured in terms of the various national
currencies.)
RE CESSION
DATE OF HIGH DEGREE INTENSITY
BEFORE (per cent
RECESSION DATE OF LOWDURATION (per per
1928 (months)cent)month)
Latvia March June 19341 75 —38 —o.6
Argentina May October —15 —0.2
Sweden May April 59 —31. —o.6
Jugoslavia May September 64 —44 —0.9
Germany July April t933 57 —36 —o.8
Norway August 19341 65 —24 —0.4
Finland August September1931. 37 —23 —0.7
Union of South Africa OctoberOctober 1932 48 —28 —0.7
Spain November May '933 54 —9 —0.2
Egypt (Cairo) November May 1933 54 —50 —1.3
Japin December June 1932 42 1.I
1929
Czechoslovakia FebruaryJanuary 1934 59 —33 —0.7
Denmark FebruarySeptember 31 —31 —1.2
France March July 1935 76 —51 —0.9
Belgium March March 1935 72 —47 —0.9
Chile March October 31 —29 —1.1
Estonia March June i933 51 —36 —0.9
United Kingdom March April 49 —31 —0.7
Hungary March November1933 56 —49 —1.2
Italy March July 1934 —46 —1.0
SOURCE:The original index numbers underlying the present measurements
have been collected by the League of Nations, Geneva, and published in the
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.
1 The low dates here recorded for Latvia, Norway and Austria are those22 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE 1(cont.)
PRICE RECESSION IN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES, 1928-1936
RECESS 10 N
DATE OF HIGH DEGREE INTENSITY
BEFORE (per cent
RECESSION DATE OF LOWDURATION (per per
1928 (months) cent)month)
Netherlands March April 49 —52 —1.5
Peru March April 1932 37 —14 —0.4
Poland March March 19362 84 —48 —o.8
Bulgaria April January 1934 57 —53 —1.3
Austria May February19331 45 —22 —0.5
DutchEastlndies May 'March 19362 82 —57 —1.0
United States July February 43 —38 —1.1
Switzerland July March 1935 68 —40 —0.7
Canada AugustFebruary1933 42 —35 —1.0
Australia September February1933 41 —28 —o.8
India (Calcutta) September March 1933 42 —43 1.3
New Zealand September January 1933 40 —i6 —0.4
preceding actual price recovery. Slightly lower points were reached earlier.
If recession be measured with reference to these earlier low points, we have
the following records for these three countries.
DATEOFHIGH KECES SI0N
BEFORE DECREE INTENSITY
RECESSION DATE OF LOW DURATION(per (per cent
(months)cent)per month)
Latvia March 1928December1931 45 —39 —1.I
NorwayAugust 1928September 1931 37 —26 —0.8
Austria May1929January 1931 20 —22 —1.3
2The low dates recorded for Poland and the Dutch East Indies are the
latest for which index numbers are available.
Early price weakness in raw materials is reflected in some
degree in the timing of price recession, by countries, but the
international pattern is not a simple one. Between the au-
tumn of 1928 and the autumn of 1929 the gradual subsid-
ence of prices that had been in progress throughout the
world since 1924—25 was converted into a general retreat.
Th.e Orient, the Near East, the Argentine and Western
Europe felt the force of the decline before the spring of 1929GENERAL ASPECTS
was over. Summer and autumn carried the storm of price
reccssion throughout Europe and into North America and
the British dominions. Unlike the break of prices in 1920,
the course of which could be charted as it swept eastward
from Japan, across the Americas, and thence to Europe,
the decline of 1928—29followedno consistent geographical
path. Price weakness, penetrating the structure of world
prices, was apparent in widely scattered areas before the
general flood was released.
The record of recovery summarized in Table 2 shows
equally diverse beginnings. In only two of the thirty-two
countries here represented did wholesale prices fail to ad-
vance, in some degree. In three countries price lows were
reached in 1931, and in three countries in 1932. In sixteen
countries wholesale price levels touched their depression
lows in 1933. That year, and notably the quarter extending
from February to April, was marked by a general upward
TABLE 2
PRICE RECOVERY IN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES, 1931-1936
A SUMMARY or CHANCES IN INDEX NUMBERS OF WHOLESALE PRICES
SINCE DATES OF DEPRESSION Lows
(Price movements are here in terms of the various national
currencies.)
REVIVAL FROM LOW TO MARCH 1936
DATE OF DURATION DEGREE INTENSITY
DEPRESSION (months) (per (per cent
LOW Cent) per ntonth)
1931
Denmark September 54 27.5 0.5
Finland September 54 15.3 0.3
Chile October 53 155.3 i.8
1932
Peru April 47 17.5 0.3
Japan June 45 30.3 o.6
Union of South AfricaOctober 14.8 0.324 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
TABLE 2(cont.)
PRICE RECOVERY IN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES, 1931-1936
REVIVAL FROM LOW TO MARCH 1936
DATE OF DURATION DEGREE INTENSITY
DEPRESSION (months) (per (per cent
LOW Cent) per month)
1933
New Zealand January 9,4 0.2
Australia February 11.7 0.3
Austria February 1 37 1.2 .0
Canada February 37 13.8 0.4
United States February 37 33.' o.8
India (Calcutta) March 36 io.8
Germany April 35 14.2 0.4
Netherlands April 35 9.9 0.3
Sweden April 35 12.4 0.3
United Kingdom April 35 12.8 0.3
Egypt (Cairo) May 34 35.5 0.9
Spain May 34 7.2 0.2
Estonia June 33 '3.9 0.4
Jugoslavia September 30 i6.i
Argentina October 29 16.2 0.5
Hungary November 28 29.9 0.9
'934
Bulgaria January 26 9.7 0.4
Czechoslovakia January 26 9.1 0.3
Norway January 2 26 10.1 04
Latvia June 8 21 6.i 0.3
Italy July 27.5 i.6
'935
Belgium March 12 24.6 i.8
Switzerland March 5.2 0.4
France July 8 16.7 '.9
1936
Dutch East Indies March 6
Poland March 6
1Slightly lower point reached in January 1931.
2 Slightly lower point reached in September
8Slightly lower point reached in December i93'.
4October1932 to April 1936. 5 July 1934 to October
6The last figure available is the lowest to date.GENERAL ASPECTS 25
surgein prices, world-wide in scope. Low points were reached
by five countries in 1934,andby three in 1935.
Wehave given above a general picture, in terms of broad
averages, of the recession of wholesale prices in the United
States and of the course of price recovery through the early
months of 1936, the whole reviewed against the background
of similar movements at other periods and in other areas.
Forty-thrce months of demoralizing decline, five months of
sharp rise and thirty-five months of irregular advance left
a price level in the United States, in June 1936, 32percent
above the February 1933low,i8 per cent below the 1929
peak,and 14percent above the 1913average.This series of
changes was not unprecedented in our history, but it is im-
probable that any previous movements imposed strains of
comparable severity upon the economic system of the United
States.
PRICE RELATIONS AND SOME CURRENT ISSUES
In following the course of recession and recovery no at-
tempt is made to cover all aspects of the economic scene, or
to deal with all the monetary and price problems that have
arisen. Attention will be concentrated on selected issues and
relations of major importance among elements of the price
system. Four matters are of particular interest:
1.Themargins, or differentials, between the prices of goods
of the same type at successive stages of the route from primary
producer to ultimate consumer are a factor of major importance
in the movement of goods into use. In a sense, goods move up-
hill from primary markets to final consumers. Labor must be
expended upon them at each stage of their progress. The imme-
diate stimulus to the activities of fabrication and transportation
necessary to transform raw materials into ultimate finished goods
is provided by a series of price differentials, which are appraised26 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
by the business man with reference to the number of units of
goods that may be moved.14
In measuring changes in the fabricational-distributional mar-
gin we shall not deal with the innumerable price differentials
affecting the movements of individual commodities, but with
certain broad averages. For the present purposes chief interest
attaches not to such items as the spread between the price of
wheat and the p1-ice of bread, but to the major or general differ-
ential between the average prices received by primary producers
for raw materials and the average prices paid by final consumers
for the wide variety of finished goods into which these materials
enter. The margin between average prices at these primary and
terminal stages represents the Cost of the services of the middle-
men who fabricate, transport and distribute the goods by which
we live. This is the central margin upon which all productive
and distributive activity, other than that of primary production,
depends. In tracing variations in this margin and in the elements
of cost and of selling price that define it we shall be dealing
with a magnitude of central importance in the working of the
economic system. Movements persisting over extended periods
are reflected in long-term variations in this margin. The first
impact of a change in industrial productivity falls upon the costs
of fabrication that are covered by this margin. The incidence
and economic consequences of inflation and deflation may be
most readily traced through the effects of such movements upon
this same major differential. And the study of recent changes in
this margin is of special interest because of critical movements
that occurred prior to and during the recession of 1929.
Becauseof changes in overhead costs, per unit of product, with variations
in quantities handled, a price differential offering attractive profits under
certain conditions may involve operating losses, with a reduced volume ol
production and trade, under other conditions.
Over a long period the incentive to business activity is provided, of course,
not by profit per unit of goods handled but by rate of return on invested
capital and, for the small entrepreneur, by rewards secured for time and
effort expended.But the factors that enter into these appraisals are not
ignored in applying the more immediate test of per unit profit.GENERAL ASPECTS 27
Changesfrom 1933to1936inthis differential reflected the
influence of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agri-
cultural Adjustment Act, as well as of elements customarily
present in recovery. The effects of the new factors upon the
immediate groups concerned, upon the margin between material
costs and selling prices to consumers and upon the working of
the price system as a regulatory mechanism have been of par-
ticular significance during certain stages of recovery.
2.Notableamong the elements of the price structure are those
defining the economic position of primary producers. Among
these, farmers stand in a distinctive position in the American
economy, which combines the features of an industrial and an
agricultural country. In spite of protective tariff walls farm
products are peculiarly exposed to the forces of world competi-
tion and to changes in world economic conditions. New elements
were introduced into the farm situation by the enforcement of
the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the Soil Conservation Act.
Special problems of other types center about the work of other
primary producers.
3. Capital goods industries play a crucial part in a modern
industrial economy. As they lead in expansion, so do they play
a dominant role in economic recession and depression. We must
trace price changes in these industries and the relations of these
changes to economic processes at large.
4. Finally, and perhaps most urgently, we are concerned with
changes in the prices of goods ready for sale to final consumers.
Prices prevailing at the terminus of the productive-distributive
process stand in a position of high strategic importance in the
working of the economic system. Prices to consumers condition
the movement of goods at all earlier stages and help to deter-
mine the volume of finished goods that may be marketed. Faulty
relationships among these prices and the prices of unfinished
goods may seriously impede productive activities.
These four points noted for special attention are by no
means unrelated. The costs of fabrication and distribution
that are represented by the margin between the prices of28 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
raw and processed goods have an obvious relation to the
selling prices of finished goods, whether intended for capital
equipment or human consumption. And the real rewards
of primary producers are conditioned, in part, by the costs
of fabrication and the prices of finished goods. The economic
developments of the stormy years from 1914to1936wrought
great changes in the fortunes of primary producers, fabri-
cators and buyers of finished goods.The succeeding chap-
ters trace some details of these developments.
Changes in Commodity Prices and in the Purchasing Power of
Given Groups of Producers
The relation between changes in prices and in the broad
streams of goods moving from producers to consumers calls for
special attention. For time differentials in the responses of prices
to the forces of recession and of revival may appear, at a given
instant, as disparities—discrepancies that may substantially alter
the volume of goods produced and sold, or their distribution
among consuming groups, or both. This relation is worthy of
brief demonstration.
The per unit price of a given commodity multiplied by the
number of units produced during a stated period yields, of
course, its total money value. Or, if we are dealing with changes
in these factors, rather than with absolute magnitudes, a relative
number (p), defining the change in per unit price over a period,
multiplied by a relative number (q), defining the change in
number of units produced, yields a measure (pq) of the change
in aggregate value of product over this period. This measure
defines changes in monetary values. If interest attaches to changes
in the aggregate purchasing power of the producers in question
• this measure of relative value must be divided by a measure (P)
of the average change, over the same period, in the per unit
price of the goods to be purchased by these producers. Thus,
using the symbols suggested, pq/P (the measures all being in
relative form) defines the change, with reference to any givenGENERAL ASPECTS 29
base,in the aggregate purchasing power of the producers of a
given commodity. The ratio of this quantity to q, the relative
defining degree of change in the amount produced, is
q
which reduces to p/P, the ratio of the price of the product to
the average price of goods to be purchased (both in relative
form). This simple ratio, then, may be taken to define the rela-
tion between changes in two important physical aggregates—the
aggregate physical rewards(or purchasing power) of a given
group and its aggregate physical production or contribution. If
we have knowledge concerning changes in these factors we may
trace the major shifts in the economic status of various groups of
producers and consumers.
We should note that shifts in the ratio of the physical produc-
tion, or the physical rewards, of a given group, to the total
physical output of the economy are not defined by the above
measurements. To measure such changes of relative status we
should have an index of Q,thetotal physical output.
Other issues with which we shall be concerned in the fol-
lowing pages relate to more general aspects of the working
of the price system. One of the important external connec-
tions of the network of interrelated values that constitute the
price structure is that defining the value of the monetary
unit in terms of gold. (This external bond may, of course,
run to some commodity or commodities other than gold.)
Th.e stimulus to change may come to the price system
through this connection, as well as from any of the elements
bound together in its internal structure.
Changes in the system of prices arising from the play of
internal forces may be far reaching. Changed conditions of
production of a• raw material that affect its price will be
reflected, in a free price system, at all stages of the produc-
tive-distributive routes along which that material moves to
ultimate users. These same changes will be reflected in the30 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
prices of competitive materials and of all their products, and
thus will spread, as do ripples in a pond, to all parts of the
price structure. If the internal force is of major proportions,
arising from the changed status of a whole group of pro-
ducers, the repercussions upon other parts of the price
system will be more violent, and the period of readjustment
will be longer.
The character of this readjustment and the period neces-
sary for its attainment will depend upon the closeness of the
ties that bind the element in which the disturbance origi-
nates to other parts of the price structure, as well as upon
the violence of the initial disturbance. In a perfectly free
and fluid system, in which all parts were free to adjust them-
selves promptly to changed relations (and in an economic
system in which corresponding physical adjustments could
be as readily made). these two factors would be, presumably,
the only ones conditioning the reaction of the system to an
internal change and affecting the ultimate readjustment.
Prices, as passive, sensitive indexes of changed economic
conditions, would transmit the necessary intelligence and
would promptly readjust themselves to the new physical re-
lations resulting from the change. If, however, prices were
not free, the degree of price inflexibility (or the degree of
tardiness of prices in their response to changes in physical
conditions, or in other prices) would enter as a third factor
affecting the duration and the character of the economic read-
justment. Under these conditions prices would cease to serve
as effective instruments for the transmission of economic
intelligence. As soon as restraints upon the free movement
of prices are introduced (restraints arising from monopoly
power, price-fixing through formal or informal agreements
or public regulation, the inertia of custom, the rigidity
of debt and other fixed charges, or the like), prices reflect
these restraints rather than the quantitative conditions ofGENERAL ASPECTS 31
marketsupply and demand. Inflexible prices, the market
representations of these restraints, may thus become active,
positive factors in economic change, influencing the physical
processes which in an ideally free system they would merely
mirror.
The same general considerations apply to a stimulus to
change developing on the monetary side, a stimulus trans-
mitted through the bond that ties the price system to a gold
(or other) standard. A change originating here, arising from
an alteration in the value of the monetary unit, would, under
conditions of perfect freedom, be communicated directly to
all parts of the price system. (It is assumed that a free gold,
or other, standard prevails, with full convertibility.) All
prices would change in equal degree, and the relationships
established on the basis of the new real value of the mone-
tary unit would be the same as those prevailing under earlier
conditions. Prices would, again, be passive instruments,
merely recording the monetary change, exerting no direct
influence upon economic processes proper. But if the price
system were not free in all its parts, if business conventions,
monopolistic powers, legal restrictions, contractual obliga-
tions, overhead charges and the physical conditions of pro-
duction imposed varying time differentials upon prices dur-
ing the process of readjustment to changed monetary values,
the primary reactions to such a change would be irregular
and incomplete. Here, again, prices would cease to play a
passive role. Instead of merely transmitting intelligence con-
cerning economic changes on the physical side, prices would
actively affect economic processes. New price relationships
created by the lagging adjustment to altered monetary values
would necessarily be reflected in changed relations among
physical forces.
This argument may be put in slightly different form: un
der the conditions noted the prices of individual commodi-32 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
ties respond to the influence of forces other than those
competitive elements of supply and demand that are assumed
to be the active factors in price changes in a free price system.
It is true, of course, that other (non-price) elements always
lie behind the behavior of prices. Prices themselves cannot
be in any sense final causes. Prices are the focusing points of
a complex of market forces and reactions, and price move-
ments and relations are the net resultants of these forces and
reactions. Prices may, however, be important intermediate
factors in a circular relationship. This point has a bearing
on the preceding reference to free prices. The concept of a
completely 'free' price system is highly abstract and unreal.
The condition is one that could never be realized under
contemporary conditions. Time differentials in price read-
justments to changing conditions are inherent in any system
of which we may conceive. Technical conditions of produc-
tion, habits, debts and other contractual obligations, institu-
tional factors of many sorts are bound to create such time-
lags in the responses of prices to forces making for change.
What is perhaps of chief importance here is that it is pre-
cisely during a period of rapid and extreme change that
such normally passive technical and institutional elements
become active factors in the economic situation. For when
wide fluctuations occur in the average level of prices, rigid-
ity in some parts of the price structure tends to. prevent
prompt adaptation of all its elements to the new situation.
The resulting changes in price relations condition the
process of physical readjustment. And since the readjustment
of physical conditions (of consumption, production, trade)
to sharply modified price relations is likely to be an extended
and economically painful process, price disparities may con-
stitute real barriers, in a positive sense, to a prompt restora-
tion of full economic activity.GENERAL ASPECTS 33
On Price Disparities
In the preceding section, and in various other parts of this
study, reference is made to 'price disparities', and to some of
their implications and consequences. The meaning that is here
given to this term should be explained.
The use of the tern 'price disparities' rests upon an implicit
assumption that the activities of a modern economy may be
viewed as the working of a closely-knit system of interdependent
The price systcm, a coherent body of related price quota-
tions on commodities, services and disposable values of all sorts,
is one element of this general structure. The operations of the
economic system, in the allocation of productive factors, in the
production and distribution of goods and services, in the appor-
tionment of income, are conditioned by the relations among the
working parts of the system as a whole and, more particularly,
by the relations among quoted prices of the factors of production
and of other commodities.
The economic system at large and the price system (which
permeates the general system as the nervous system permeates
the human body) arc subject to the play of forces that alter the
relations among their constituent elements. If we assume a state
of equilibrium priorone of these changes, compensating move-
ments must occur after the initial change in a given relation.
In a highly integrated industrial economy such as ours today
these compensating movements may extend over a wide area and
may require considerable time, before balance is again achieved.
The extent of the co:cnpensation necessary and the time required
for compensation to 'be effected will depend upon the magnitude
of the original change, upon its economic incidence (if it origi-
nates outside the economic system) and upon the nature and
closeness of the relations that bind the elements first affected to
the system at large.
Our immediate co:cicern is with certain aspects of the changes
that are manifest in the system of prices, changes that may origi-
nate anywhere, within or without the economic system proper.34 PRICES INRECESSIONAND RECOVERY
We define as a price disparity the condition prevailing after a
shift in price relations to which there has not been complete
adaptation among elements of the economic system at large. We
take the terni adaptation, in the above definition, to mean such
adjustment in respect of the volume or character of production,
allocation of man-power, investment of capital, distribution of
income, or disposition of other elements of economic life as may
be necessary to a working balance of economic elements, with
effective utilization of available productive resources.
This general definition of price disparity and of economic
maladjustment suffers because definite criteria of disparity and of
maladjustment are not available. The definition goes back to a
rather vague conception of a state of balance, or equilibrium,
or mutual adjustment among the working parts of an abstract
entity called the economic system. In the present state of our
economic knowledge, when the conditions of balance, or even
of operating efficiency, in the economic system at large may not
be precisely defined, this weakness in the definition is hard to
correct. We shall shortly suggest certain more concrete types of
evidence, bearing upon the presence or absence of what we have
called price disparities. These are more specific than the general
condition noted in the definition, but the precise circumstances
of disparity remain elusive.
With reference to the general definition given above, dispari-
ties are, of course, always present. They are, indeed, a customary
condition of economic life, since changes in market conditions
and price relations are continually occurring, with favorable
consequences in some directions, unfavorable consequences in
others. In resp&t of price disparities, as in so many other eco-
nomic problems, it is the time factor, in relation to the experi-
ence upon which economic behavior is based, that is of central
importance. Serious difficulties develop only when a state of
non-adaptation persists beyond the period within which adjust-
ment is to be expected, on the basis of experience. If, in the
market for a perishable product, current marketings are not
promptly adapted to changed price and buying conditions, pro-
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ducers may suffer serious loss. Here a real disparity may develop
over a very short Similarly, a disparity involving harm-
ful consequences may develop in the field of agricultural prices
if adaptation to changed conditions is not effected within a single
planting, growing and harvesting season. In such a market as
that for capital goods the duration of a business cycle may be
the period within wlTdch experience leads us to expect mutual
adjustment of prices andphysicalconditions to a changed set of
relations.
It is, then, only when a price disparity continues beyond the
expected period of adjustment that we may think of it as per-
sistent. True,reduced production and reduced real incomes may
result from (or accompany) disparities that are not persistent,
in this sense. Non-persistent disparities, equally with persistent
disparities, may be manifestations of economic pathology. For
the disparities developing and being corrected over the course
of a single business cycle may entail serious losses. The term
disparity may properly be used for both types of maladjustment,
although persistent disparities are of special interest because of
their probable connection with enduring changes in the eco-
nomic structure.
A fair question arises as to the circumstances that may be
responsible for the prolongation of the period of adjustment
beyond normal expectancy. In general, perhaps, an extension of
the time required for adaptation to changed economic relations
of any sort may be attributed either to exceptional severity or
persistence of the force creating disparity, or to change in the
operating characterisi:ics of the system affected. By the latter is
meant a change that alters the reaction of the system to given
influences. Thus a loss of flexibility by important elements of
the economic system might seriously reduce the adaptive powers
of the system as a whole. Persistent post-War price disparities
might be attributed to the excessive severity of the forces affect-
ing the price system and the economic system at large, or to
changes in these systems that caused them to react, in post-War
years, in a manner different from that prevailing in earlier times.36 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
Circumstances of both types probably played a part in the ob-
served changes.
Specific manifestations of price disparity are difficult to define.
Innumerable price changes occur from day to day and from
month to month, and it is impossible to draw a sharp line be-
tween those that constitute disparities, representing definite
economic faults, those to which adjustment has been readily
effected and those that actually stimulate activity through the
opening of new profit opportunities. As a working basis for a
review of price movements, we may say that prima facie evidence
of price disparity in a competitive economy is provided by the
following conditions:
Rapid and violent alteration of a set of established price
relations.
Price changes of considerable magnitude not accompanied
by corresponding changes in production costs.
Important changes in productivity, not accompanied by
corresponding changes in selling prices.
A sharp reduction in the volume of production and trade.
Unemployment of productive factors.
A considerable variation over a relatively short period in
the relations among the incomes of producing groups.
Whether the presence of one or more of these conditions, in a
given situation, is in fact evidence of price disparity must be
determined, as well as may be, in the light of all the known
circumstances.
We may not here explore the implications and consequences
of price disparities. These will concern us in the course of the
detailed discussion in later sections. Shifts of economic advan-
tage and of purchasing power from group to group, changes in
the volume and character of commodities produced, in the
amount and form of savings and in the direction of investment
—these may result from, or accompany, inequalities in the
changes occurring among different elements of the price systemGENERAL ASPECTS 37
to which adaptation of their economic elements has not been ef-
fected.'5
In following the course of events between 1929 and
1936weshall be concerned with some general problems
suggested by the preceding discussion. A price system operat-
ing under conditions of partial freedom and partial rigidity,
composed of elements marked by diverse modes of behavior
and bound together by ties of varying degrees of intimacy,
was exposed first to a violent recession and then to the forces
of a recovery marked by highly novel elements. How did it
respond? Was its role in the recession that of transmitting
intelligence of changes on the physical side, or did it play
an active, positive part in determining the character of
the recession and the course of the depression? How did
the system as a who]e, and its chief elements, respond to the
stimulus of recovery? Did prices furnish clear guides to
the economic activity required under the conditions of de-
pression and recove:ry? These questions suggest some of the
general problems faced in a survey of recent price changes.
Other issues arise more directly from the program of re-
covery initiated in the United States early in i Reference
has already been made to the potential influence upon prices
of the National Industrial Recovery Act and of the various
•industrial codes based on it. The suspension of provisions
of the anti-trust acts, the permission, in some cases, of price-
fixing agreements, the recogTlition of open-price agreements,
the setting of minimum wage rates and the writing into
many codes of provisions that selling prices should not be
lower than costs of production, brought important changes
in the structure and working of the price system, during the
15Ihave discussed some implications of price changes in a non-flexible
economic system in a paper in the volume, Economic Essays in Honor of
Wesley Clair Mitchell (Columbia University Press, pp.377—8t.38 PRICES IN RECESSION AND RECOVERY
period of code enforcement. Again, the setting by law of a
precise standard to which the average purchasing power of
farm products should be restored, if possible, introduced
another and entirely novel factor into the economic situa-
tion. Of a different order were the monetary measures
adopted by the Administration in the effort to check defla-
tion, to bring about a general price advance, andlighten
the burden of debts carried over from an era of higher prices.
Here were forces impinging upon the price system from
without, modifying its structure and conditioning its work-
ing. These also belong in the picture of price changes in the
recent past.
This introduction is intended to provide the setting of the
present inquiry. General aspects of the decline and of the
recovery to date have been dealt with. An attempt has been
made to provide perspective by setting recent movements in
the United States against movements at other times and in
other regions. Finally, reference has been made to certain
features of the price structure, and various questions have
been raised that will require consideration in later sections.
We pass now to a brief consideration of the situation prevail-
ing when the storm of 1929wasloosed.